An inquiry by the Israeli Defence Force has found that the Hamas October 7 attacks were ‘one of the greatest failures’ in the history of the nation’s military.
The attacks on October 7 2023 saw thousands of Hamas fighters storm into southern Israel where they killed 1,320 Israelis and took a further 251 hostage.
Now a damning internal investigation into the events has claimed the inability to prevent the attacks were a ‘complete failure’ of the Israeli security and the result of years of planning and deception by Hamas.
The IDF goes as far to admit it ‘failed in its mission to protect people’ and revealed that the security forces were taken off guard by the attack with only the minimum number of soldiers stationed by the border on that day.
According to the inquiry, seen by Sky News, as many as 5,600 terrorists broke into Israel on October 7 in three waves.
Hamas fighters entered Israel from Gaza in three waves with the majority of killings and kidnappings taking place in the first two waves between 6.30am and 9am.
The third wave in the afternoon saw other terrorists join civilians who were ‘a mob taking advantage’ rather than Hamas fighters.
All this time the IDF battled to retake control of the area with officers resorting to the usage of Google maps and mobile phones to talk to each other.
IDF soldiers in the Israeli town of Ofakim on October 8 2023. An inquiry by the Israeli Defence Force has found that the Hamas October 7 attacks were ‘one of the greatest failures’ in the history of the nation’s military
Palestinians stand atop of a Israeli military vehicle after breaking down a border fence in Gaza on October 7 2023. Officers had noticed an unusual activity in Gaza before the attack according to the report
Israel’s iron dome missile system intercept rockets fired from Gaza on October 8 2023
The Israeli Air Forces have even admitted that they struggled to distinguish between Hamas terrorists and Israeli civilians and have admitted some deaths were caused by friendly fire.
By the earlier evening the IDF was still struggling to regain control with Hamas fighters spread out across southern Israel and were even planning to reach the major city of Ashkelon – 12 miles from the Gaza Strip.
The report – which has taken tens of thousands of hours of work to put together – said that Gaza was seen as a secondary threat with the IDF’s primary focus being on Iran and Hezbollah.
Forces had also been moved up to the Lebanon border with the army believing an expensive subterranean wall surrounding the strip was sufficient to prevent an attack.
Shocking intelligence assessments from before the attacks believed that Hamas lacked the capability to launch a full-scale war and also did not want one.
The IDF also wrongly believed that there would be an early warning before any attack.
Based on that, officials said soldiers ‘were addicted to the precise intelligence information’ and failed to challenge the assumptions internally.
Officers had noticed an unusual activity in Gaza before the attack – such as the activation of Israeli sim cards- but didn’t think it was time-critical and further investigation was needed.
Palestinians break into the Israeli side of Israel-Gaza border fence on October 7 2023. The report – which has taken tens of thousands of hours of work to put together – said that Gaza was seen as a secondary threat with the IDF’s primary focus being on Iran and Hezbollah
Israeli civilians in the street following damage caused by a rocket launched into Ashkelon. Fighters were attempting to reach the city which is 12 miles from the Gaza Strip
Hamas activity in the area was also dismissed as a training exercise following a consultation with senior commanders in the night.
An assessment of the late night activity was supposed to take place the next morning however before that could take place Hamas had already stormed into Israel.
The IDF were also reportedly taken by surprise by the scale and brutality of the attacks.
Various intelligence sources believe that Hamas had first started to plan the attack almost a decade ago in November 2016 before it was formally approved in July 2019.
Hamas was close to launching the attacks on three occasions during 2022 but decided not to for unknown reasons.
They eventually chose to attack Israel on October 7 2023 to take advantage of a Jewish religious holiday in 2023.
In the years before the attack, Hamas underwent a mass deception campaign to convince the Israeli government it wanted economic prosperity rather than conflict.
A further 41 findings from individual attacks on specific kibbutzim, military bases and key roads are set to be presented to the affected communities in the coming days.
Israeli soldiers take cover on a street in Ashkelon following an air raid siren
Benjamin Netanyahu’s govenrment has rejected calls for State Commission of Inquiry, saying the time is not yet right because of the ongoing war.
Critics of the Prime Minister have claimed he is avoiding responsibility for his role as leader of the nations at the time of the attacks.
It is estimated 66 hostages taken on October 7 being held by Hamas. About half of all the hostages still in Gaza are believed to be alive.
On October 7 2023 Hamas launched an attack into Israel killing over 1,000 Israelis and took a further 251 as hostages.
In response Israel launched a military campaign against Gaza which has killed at least 48,247 Palestinians.
